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nary sense. If a trust is sufciently
expressed it does not disparage,
much less defeat it, to call it "precatory." But in order that a trust
may be raised from the use of precatory wdrds it must be shown from
the words themselves, taken in
connection with all the terms of the
gift, and the circumstances and situation of the testator when he used
them, that the testator's intention

to raise a trust was'full, settled and
complete.
The uncertainties of litigation
should induce counsel to advise
against the careless use of precatoryexpressions. Testators should
,be persuaded either to create a trust
in plain language, or to forego the
pleasure of admonishing the recipients of their bounty.
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Regulate Commerce.

4r oJ the Act to

Where two companies by their joint tariff make a\ new and independent line, the rates thereon do not furnish a basis upon which either
company is obliged to adjust its local rates.
The language of the body of 4
of the Federal "Act to Regulate
Commerce" is as follows:
"It'shall be unlawful for any
common carrier subject to the pro-.
visions of this act, to charge or
receive any greater compensation
in the aggregate, for the transportation of passengers or of like kind
of property under substantially
1 Reported in 53 Fed. Rep.,

229.

similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer
distance over the same line in the
same direction; the shorter being
included in the longer distance."
The question as to the construction of the word "line" in this
section may be stated briefly to be,
whether it means a physical line or
a business arrangement. The ques-
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tion usually necessarily discussed
at the same time as to what constitutes an "arrangement," belongs
more properly to the consideration
of I.
The 1iractical problem presented
by this question is as to whether
local shipments, shipments underagreed through rates to terminals'
with local rates added to intermediate points, under a through
bill of lading, and shipments
entirely under agreed 'through
rates, through billing, and through
bills of lading; all in the same
directi6n, *over the same physical
line, the shorter being included in
the longer distance, are shipments.
over "the same line" within the
meaning of 4.
Much labor has been expended
over the study of similar clauses in
English railway acts, in three
State constitutions, and in fQurteen
State statutes, and of decisions
thereon. In no one of these caseg
is the language construed precisely
similar to that of the Federal Act,
and little light has been obtained
from these sources.
In 1884, three years prior to the
passage ofthe Interstate Commerce
Act, the first suggestion as to the
construction of -the word "line,"
adopted in the annotated case,
came from the United States Supreme Court in the case of A. T. &
S.F.R.R. v: D. &N. 0. R. R., iio
U. S., 684. The most concise statement of the meaning and effect of
this decision is that of Judge
DxADY, in ex farle Koehler, Circuit Court, D. Oregon, 31 Fed.
Rep., 318:
"The judgment of the Court is
authority, then, for this proposition: Two or more corporations,
in order to meet competition, may
form a through line, and charge
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through rates for transportation
thereon, which may be less than
the sum of the local rates of the
several roads constituting the line;
and the portion of the through rate
received by each corporation may
be less than the local rate charged by
said corporation for carrying freight
over the whole length of its road."
The importance of the decision
for the purposes of this annotation
consists in its conception of the
through line formed by two or
more railroad companies as a different "line" from that of either
or any of the companies.
4 came up for discusWhen
sion in the United States Senate,
a question was put to Senator Culloin as to the proportions which
would have to be maintained between rates on local traffic fron
Boston to Albany, and rates on
through traffic to Boston via Albany. He answered:
"It has nothing to do with it.
One is a line of railroad by itself;
the other is a line of railroad in
conjunction with one, two, or five
others, if you please, and the one
rate does not control the others:"

I. C. R., Vol.

i,

p. 56o.

In ex piarteKoehler, cited above,
alihough the"very suggestive opinion in Atchison, etc., R. Co. v.
Denver, etc., R. Co., was cited,
yet the decision was placed upon
the clause "under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions," and the question of the
meaning of the words "over the
same line" was not discussed.
The first decision of the Commission in a case in which this question
was raised was in Boston & A. R.
Co. v. Boston & L. R. Co. I. C. R.,
Vol. I, p. 571. The Commission
summarizes this decision as follows (Report for 1887, p. 22):
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"' In some cases the lower rate on
the longer line is a combination of
rates over several lines; and it has
been contended in some quarters
'thAt 4 only applies (sic)to, cases
in which the carrier who makes the
greater charge for the shorter haul
controls the line of longer haul and
makes the charge upon that also.
The Conimission does not take this
view, buit has decided that where a
carrier unites with one or more
others in making a rate for longhaul traffic, the rate so made constitutes a measure for the rates on
short-haul traffic upon its own lines
as much as it would if the longhaul transportation was on its line
exclusively.2 '
In the decision itself the followking words are used: "By the word
'l 'e' in the act, a physical line is
mqnnt, and not a business arrangement."
/In,i89r, inJames &Mayer Buggy
Co. v. C. N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. I.
C. R., Vol. 11, p. 682, the entire
question was brought squarely before the Commission. In that case
the claim was made substantially
that a through "line" had been
formed by three companies making
through rates to the terminal station
of the last road; that no agreement
of any kind had been made for
through rates to intermediate stations on the last road, traffic being
carried thereto under partly local
rates; that, therefore, goods destined to the terminal station and
goods destined to said intermediate
stations were not carried over "the.
same line." The decision of the
Commission was against this contention, and shortly thereafter,
during the year 1891, the Commission applied to the U. S. Circuit
Court for the Northern District of
Georgia to enforce its decision.

In the case of Georgia R. R.
Commission v. Clyde S. S. Co., et
als., I. C. R., Vol. iv, p. 122 (November, 1892), the Commission reaffirmed its decision in the case last
above cited. The opinion in the
'Georgia R. R. Commission Case
was written subsequently to the
decision by Judge SHIRAS, in Osborne v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.,
48 Fed. Rep., 49, but prior to the
reversal of that decision by the
Circuit Court of Appeals in an
opinion hereinafter cited. In a
note to the opinion of the Commission, it is stated that nothing in the
Circuit Court of Appeals decision
"necessarily decided" conflicts
with the opinion of the Commission ; but so much of the authority
upon the Interstate Commerce Act
consists of dicta that it is hardly
advisable in these limnits to go into
that question.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in
the decision referred to (52 Fed.
Rep., 912), through BREWER, Circuit Justice, said:
"Where two companies, owning
connecting lines of road, unite in a
joint through tariff, they form for
the connected roads practically a
new and independent line. Neither
company is bound to adjust its own
local tariff to suit the other, nor
compellable to make a joint tariff
with it. It may insist upon charging its local rates for all transportation over its line. If, therefore, the
two companies by agreement make
a joint tariff over their lines or any
parts of their lines, such joint tariff
is not the basis by which the reasonableness of the local tariff of either
line is determined (p. 914).
"The use of the word 'line' is
significant. Two carriers may use
the same road, but each has it separate line. The defendant may
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lease trackage rights to any other
railroad company, but the joint use
of the same track does not create

the 'same line,' so as to compel
either company to graduate its
tariff by that of the other" (p. 916).
The annotated case (United States
v. Mellen) was decided one month
later by the District Court, D. Kansas. The expressions cited above,
in the Osborne case, left the Court
little to.do but to repeat and follow
them.
After the decisions in the Mellen
and Osborne cases, the District
Court for the Northern District of
Georgia passed upon the application which had been made to it by
the Commission in the James &
Mayer Buggy Co. case. The title
of the suit is Int. Com. Comn. v.
Cin., N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., et al.,
and the decision was rendered on
June 3, 1893. It has not yet been
reported. The Court said:
"The mere reception and continuous transportation by the Georgia Railroad Company of freight
which comes to it over other lines
of railroads, destined to its local
stations, for which the initial carrier
has issued through bills of lading
and quoted through rates, does not
constitute such -an 'arrangemeilt'
as is contemplated by I of the
Act to Regulate Commerce, where
the through rates so quoted allow
to that company its full local
rates.
"The Cincinnati, etc., Co., Western, etc., Co., and Georgia R. R.

Co. have formed a 'new and independent line' by the adoption of a
joint through tariff from Cincin-'
nati to Augusta; but such 'new
line ' is distinct from that of either'
of the railroads named."
This decision forms the latest
adjudication upon this subject. It
is more explicit than an - prior
decision, not only upon the point
discussed herein, but upon other
clauses and other sections of the
act.
The importance of the entire
line of decisions will be recognized when it it understood that differences between through and local
rates were formerly excepted from
the operation of 4 under only thh
"substantially similar circumstances and conditions" clause. This
not only left the question within
the hazy limits of an extremely
vague general clause, but it compelled, under all circumstances,
the observance of some undefined
relations between rates on through
lines and local rates. But under
the emphatic declaration of Justice
BRZwnR, in the Osborne case, the

tariff over a joint or through line is
not "the basis by which the reasonableness of the local tariff of either
line is' determined." Under the'
law each rate must be reasonable
in itself; .and this requirement,
vague as it is, has never been made
clearer by the forced comparison
of rates essentially different.
VICTOR IovY.

